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SOCIAL MORPES, LEGAL ANALYSIS, AND THE JOURNAL
Ever since its foundation in 189o it has been the policy of the YALE
LAW JOURNAL to represent in all its phases the work done in the Yale
Law School. For many years this has included a critical review of
current decisions and the publication of articles by scholars and jurists
in the fields of modem American law, Roman law, comparative law,
and legal history. It has been the purpose of the JOURNAL thus to aid
in the improvement of legal education, to further the development of
our law as a system, and to do its part in bringing about a consistent
and satisfactory application of the law to the actual circumstances of
life.
In the last few years, this general purpose has certainly been inten-
sified, especial emphasis being placed upon two matters: The first
of these is that the rules of human action that we know as law are
constantly changing, that no system of human justice is eternal, that
law forms but a part of our ever-changing §ocial mores, and that it is
the function of lawyers, of jurists, and of law schools to cause the
statement and the application of our legal rules to be in harmony with
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the mores of the present instead of those of an outgrown past. The
second matter upon which emphasis has been placed, and the one per-
haps which has been most obvious in recent pages of the JOURNAL, has
been the necessity of a more exact terminology leading to a more
accurate legal analysis.
In the second of these two matters the work of the JOURNAL received
a tremendous impetus from the personality and the work of the late
Professor Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld of Yale. Like him there are
many who have realized that our existing terminology is grossly
defective, that our current legal concepts are complex and shifting
in character and content, and that we should have at our command
legal concepts more fundamental in character.
Many jurists have taken long steps in the right direction. But to
the JOURNAL it has seemed that it is Professor Hohfeld's articles on
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning'
that clearly open the way to the improvement in legal analysis and to
the eventual restatement of the law for which all legal thinkers have
been yearning. Professor Hohfeld did not either discover or invent
the concepts or the terms in which they are expressed, but he isolated
them and fixed their meaning. By arranging them ingeniously in a
series of correlatives and opposites, he made possible an exactness in
legal concept, an invariability in usage, and an analysis of the complex
into the simple.2 To the JOURNAL it seems that no restatement or
reclassification or codification of the law should be undertaken except
with the aid of Professor Hohfeld's fundamental legal conceptions.
A restatement that is constructed out of such complex conceptions of
such shifting content as "property," "rights in rent," "trusts," "con-
tract," "quasi-contract," will amount to little more than another com-
mercial encyclopedia. A reclassification that continues to insist upon
the supposed "fundamental" difference between equity and common
law, while quite properly forgetting the once-supposed "fundamental"
differences between them and the law administered by the admiralty,
the church, the courts of the merchants, the city courts, and the local
courts, can no longer properly be regarded as a desirable reclassifica-
tion. It will be soon enough to talk about restatement and reclassifi-
cation when the teachers of law, the judges, the law writers, and the
more intelligent lawyers are familiar with the simple concepts arranged
'(1913) 23 YALE LAw JOURNAL, I6; (1917) 26 ibid., 710.
'Professor Hohfeld's arrangement is as follows:
t right privilege power immunity
Iural Opposites no-right duty disability liability
Jural Correlatives right privilege power immunity
I duty no-right liability disability
The JOURNAL expects to publish during the year short comments explanatory
of each of these fundamental conceptions. Of course the original articles them-
selves by Professor Hohfeld should be given the most intensive study.
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by Professor Hohfeld and understand the revolution they work in
legal analysis.
In any event, we must realize and confess that no restatement or
classification is final. If our ancestors supposed "justice" to be eter-
nal and "law" to be a series of unchangeable a priori rules from which
decisions of all special cases could be deduced, so also they supposed
the world to be flat and to be the fixed center about which the firma-
ment revolved. The world moves around the sun, for all that; and
history affords the perspective in which we can observe that "law"
changes with the mores of the community and that "the mores can
make anything right."3  No ingenious arrangement of fundamental
legal concepts, no mere machinery or terminology, however exact, can
determine for us what the existing law is or what we shall make it for
the future. That will be determined, now as in the past, by the vary-
ing feelings and customs and desires and needs of men. Hence those
who state or who administer the law must be wise in the mores of
their own times, must keep perpetually up to date. Restatement in
accordance with new mores is legislation, and this is the function of
writers and judges as well as of legislators. Judicial legislation is
piecemeal and interstitial; 4 sometimes it is criticised as ex post facto;5
but it is experimental, eclectic, and rooted in experience; it affects
only the parties litigant unless other judges believe in its wisdom; and
in any case it is unavoidable. The legislation of a law writer, is syste-
matic and wholesale; it may be too dogmatic and prejudiced and
pedantic; but it is effective only so far as it is convincing to judges
and lawyers. Parliamentary or popular legislation may be systematic
or not, wholesale or retail. It, too, is effective only as it is construed
and administered by judges and executives. If not in harmony with
prevailing mores it becomes dead letter after doing greater or less
damage. We can only pray for wiser legislators, whether they be
popular, parliamentary, judicial, or pedagogical.
The JOURNAL solicits especially and expects to publish contributions
making use of the new analysis and showing an understanding of the
connection of the mores and the law, the mores of marriage and the
family, the mores of production and business, the mores of organized
human society.
THE LAW SCHOOL
The present year promises to be one of the best in the history of
the School. The number of students registered is already larger than
that just prior to the war, and the faculty is once more almost complete.
'See William G. Sumner, Folkways (igo6); A. G. Keller, Societal Evolution
(ig1) and his article Law in Evolution (1gig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 769.
4Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (igi6)
244 U. S. 205, 221, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 531.
James C. Carter, Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function (i9o7) 185.
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A Summer Session was held from June 19 to August 30, probably the
first in the history of the School. Its purpose was largely to meet the
needs of men just returned from war service; but the session attracted
many others who desired to hasten the completion of their law study.
More than eighty students were in attendance, and courses were given
in Real Property, Evidence, Bankruptcy, Criminal Law, Partnership,
Administrative Law, and Code Pleading.
The faculty has been greatly strengthened by the addition of several
new men and by the return of some others from war service.
Professor Edward S. Thurston comes to Yale from the University
of Minnesota, after more than two years in the Army. He served as
Lieutenant Colonel and Judge Advocate of the American Expeditionary
Forces at Archangel. He has had a long and very successful record
as a teacher of law and he has published Thurston's Cases on Quasi-
Contracts. The courses assigned to him are Torts, Trusts and
Equity I.
Professor Willard T. Barbour was professor of law at the University
of Michigan until called to Yale. He had previously studied with
Vinogradoff at Oxford, and his published work in the History of Con-
tract in Early English Equity has received high praise. Professor
Barbour will give courses in Equity II and Legal History. During the
second half year he will be given leave of absence to deliver the Car-
pentier Lectures at the Columbia Law School as had previously been
arranged.
Mr. Charles E. Clark has been made Assistant Professor of Law,
and will give courses in Property I, Damages, Insurance, Legal Ethics
and Office Practice. He has already given a course in Real Property
during the Summer Session. Professor Clark graduated from Yale
College in 1911 and from the Yale Law School in 1913, in each instance
at the head of his class. Since graduation he has practiced law success-
fully in New Haven. He is a joint author of Cleaveland, Hewitt &
Clark on Connecticut Probate Law and Practice.
Mr. George E. Woodbine has been appointed an Assistant Professor
to do work partly in the School of Law and partly in the Department
of History. He graduated from Yale College in 19o3 and from the
Law School cure laude in 1919. The first volume of his monumental
edition of Bracton has been published and has been approved by the
best legal scholars. He will do further writing and publication in
English Legal History and will offer work for advanced students.
Mr. Karl N. Llewellyn, after giving the course in Bills and Notes
last year and a course in Partnership during the summer, has been
made Instructor in Law. His courses this year will be Bills and Notes,
Sales and Partnership. He graduated from Yale College in 1915 with
high honors and from the Yale Law School in 1918 at the head of his
class. His work as editor-in-chief of the YALE LAW JOURNAL last year
was of the highest quality, and he has entered upon his career as a
teacher with great enthusiasm.
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Professor Edmund M. Morgan, whose election as Professor of Law
was announced in 1917, entered upon his work at Yale for the first
time last June, giving courses in Evidence and Code Pleading in the
Summer Session. He entered war service at the outbreak of the war
and became Lieutenant Colonel in the Judge Advocate General's office
in Washington. In that capacity he received recognition as one of
the ablest men in the department. His work in the University of Min-
nesota had already shown him to be especially gifted as a law teacher.
His courses at Yale will be Evidence, Court Practice, and Pleading.
His teaching of Court Practice has been most practical and successful.
It will here be based chiefly on the systems in New York and Con-
necticut.
Professor William H. Taft is again giving his course on Constitu-
tional Law, after a year's absence for service on the War Labor Board.
Professor John W. Edgerton is still on leave of absence because of
illness, but it is now fully expected that he will be able to return to his
work at the end of the present year, if not before.
At no previous time has the School of Law had so many and so
enthusiastic resident professors devoting their whole time to teaching,
research, and publication.
OPTIONS AND THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
A recent Connecticut decision, Lewis Oyster Co. v. West (1919,
Conn.) 107 Atl. 138, brings up again the question of options and the
rule against perpetuities. West bought a wharf from Lewis. As
a part of the same transaction West covenanted for himself and his
heirs, with Lewis, his heirs and assigns, that if ever he should sell
certain oyster grounds, he would, at the option of Lewis, to be ex-
pressed within six months from the time the latter should receive
written notice of such sale, reconvey the wharf property to Lewis for
a certain sum. Later the devisee of West leased the premises to the
defendant for a term of ninety-nine years, with option of renewal; the
parties intended by this to wipe out Lewis's rights, of which the de-
fendant had notice. Within six months after notice of this lease, the
assignee of Lewis brought suit to have the lease declared void and to
have his option enforced. It was held by the court that the covenant
was void as violating the rule against perpetuities, and that the plain-
tiff was not entitled to relief.
This is clearly another occurkence of the negative contract in options
already commented upon in these pages.1 Instead of a positive option,
i. e., instead of a power in the option holder on his own motion to put
the option giver under a duty to convey, there is here only the so-called
right of preemption. What Lewis got by the agreement was at best a
I See C0MENT (1918) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 65, cited in the opinion of the
principal case.
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conditional option; a continuing negative duty on the part of the
covenantor not to convey the wharf property to anyone else without
first offering it to him; together with a disability in the covenantor
to rid himself of that duty in any way other than by offering Lewis
the property; and that offer would give Lewis a positive option to
purchase. But Lewis could acquire this positive option only as a
result of an act on the part of his option giver. Inasmuch as the
option giver or his heirs might not perform that act within the period
allowed by the rule against perpetuities, the "vesting of any interest"
in the option holder or his heirs in the premises might be postponed
beyond that same period. The case is therefore clearly correct by the
law of any jurisdiction which bases its test of a perpetuity on remote-
ness and not on inalienability.
Both of these tests of a plerpetuity have been, and are yet, employed.
It is now definitely settled in England that even a positive option may
offend the rule against perpetuities, and that it does so offend if the
option-power is one which need not necessarily be exercised by its
holder within the time limitations of the rule. This has been the law
since the decision in London Ry. Co. v. Gomm.2 That case had to
do with a positive option, but it is interesting to notice in connection
with the present discussion, that the case expressly overruled by that
decision, Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwrights involved a negative
contract, a right of preemption only, and not a positive option. Later
English decisions have consistently followed the rule in the Gomm
case.4 With this many of our jurisdictions agree." During the devel-
opment of the English rule, however, and before it had reached its
present form, a number of cases were decided on the basis that the
test to be applied to a limitation was that of inalienability rather than
that of remoteness. 6 Following these earlier cases, New York and
several other states have, by statute, adopted a different rule from that
on which the principal case was decided. In such jurisdictions the
rule against perpetuities is not offended if there are persons in being
by whom, singly or in conjunction, an absolute title can be conveyed. 7
It would seem that this test when applied either to positive options or
'London Ry. Co. v. Gomm (1882) 20 Ch. Div. 562.
'Birmingham Canal Co. v. Cartwright (1879) II Ch. Div. 421.
'For a list of cases, see James, The Law of Option Contracts (1916) secs.
219, 220.
' Ibid. To the list of American cases there cited add, Henderson v. Bell (1918,
Kan.) 173 Pac. 1124, and Barton v. Thaw (1914) 26 Pa. St. 348, 92 At. 312.
'Many of these cases were reviewed in the Gomm case, supra.
" For an outline of the historical development, see Becker v. Chester (1902) 115
Wis. 90, lO7, lo8, 91 N. W. 87, 94. As to the rule under statutes providing against
suspension of the power 'of alienation, see James, op. cit., sec. 221. It should be
noted, however, that Avern v. Lloyd (1868) L. R. 5 Eq. 383, which together with
Canal Co. v. Cartwright, supra, was an authority for inalienability as the test,
was distinctly overruled by In re Hargreaves (189o, C. A.) 43 Ch. Div. 4O.
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to rights of preemption, where the persons are ascertained, could lead
to but one result, viz., that the covenantor and the covenantee con-
curring could at any time alienate the land absolutely.8
The principal case was decided in a jurisdiction which used the test
of remoteness. No time was specified in the covenant, but since the
language expressly read "to his heirs," it was properly held that the
covenant must be taken to run on indefinitely through time. But where
the covenant does not so read as to run on thus indefinitely, a mere
failure to specify a time limit ought not in itself to make a right of
preemption void because of remoteness. Although in options time is of
the essence, yet where no time is expressly mentioned a reasonable
time will be understood.9 And no reason appears why the right of
preemption should not be assignable throughout this reasonable
period.' 0 In the principal case the court held that the covenant was
assignable, though unlimited in point of time."
As is well known, the rule against perpetuities does not apply to
"vested" interests, nor to future interests destructible at the pleasure
of the owner of the present estate.1 2 And in our present case the
plaintiff claimed that the future limitation was destructible by the
person for the time being entitled to the property. It was the opinion
of the court, however, that though by giving notice the covenantor
might compel the covenantee to exercise or abandohl his right of pre-
emption, the covenantee's right was not destructible in the sense which
relieves a future limitation from the objection of remoteness; that is,
not in the sense in which a tenant in tail can destroy a future limitation
by barring the entail. And the option-holder's interest can in reason
hardly be declared destructible by the owner, when the latter's only
means of "destroying" it is to create in the option-holder, over a
period of six months, in the instant case, a direct, positive power to
acquire a right to immediate conveyance of the land. As to the matter
of vested interests, even if we grant that the negative promise creates
some sort of interest in the wharf property, that interesL 's decidedly
contingent. 3  Obviously in the case under discussion the plaintiff covld
8 Such was the conclusion of the court in Canal Co. v. Cartwright, supra.
'Corbin, Option Contracts (1914) 23 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 641, 668; James,
op. cit., sec. 22Z
0 Corbin, op. cit., 658.
' It need hardly be said that although there may be no specific performance
of a contract to convey land which offends the rule against perpetuities, as far
as the personal obligation is concerned, an action at law may be maintained for
the breach of the covenant. On the specific performances of options generally,
see (1917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 783.
'Pulitzer v. Livingston (1896) 89 Me. 359, 36 At. 635.
' Certainly so if, as seems to be the case, the "vesting" of an interest means
acquisition by the interest's owner of the certainty of right and privilege, present
or future, to obtain and enjoy the corpus, the realty.
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base no valid claim either on the ground of destructiblity or on the
ground of vested interest.
When we come to positive options, this question of a vested interest
may not so easily be put aside. Has the option-holder an interest
in the land? Some interest he clearly seems to have.14  It is not un-
usual for the option-holder's power to be called an equitable interest.5
On the other hand it has been held that he has merely a "power to
acquire an interest"; that the contract does not, of itself, vest him with
any interest or estate in the land, but merely points out the mode by
which he may acquire an interest.' Yet other courts have held that
there is an interest, not vested, but contingent.17  It is quite conceivable
that different options may give different degrees of interest in the
land. In point here is the suggestion already made in these pages that
there may be a real and practical distinction between an option in gross
to purchase the fee, and an option to purchase the fee attached to a
leasehold of the land in question and exercisable only during the term.18
Though just what constitutes a vested interest may be a matter of con-
siderable doubt, the courts have not seemed and do not seem to regard
the positive option-holder as having such a vested interest in the land,
although at his merest whim he can put the option giver under a duty
to convey to him. This statement is in direct opposition to the literal
meaning of a passage in the third edition of Gray's Rule against Per-
petuities: "If a man has the present unconditional right (power) to
acquire the present absolute interest he is regarded by the Rule against
Perpetuities as already having such interest."" It is submitted, how-
ever, that the same passage as it stands in the first edition is a better
statement of the author's real meaning and of the law, "If a man who
has a vested limited interest in property has the present unconditioned
right (power) to turn that limited interest into an absolute interest,
and thus to acquire the present unconditioned absolute interest, he is
regarded by the Rule against Perpetuities as already having such
interest." What the option-holder needs in addition to his uncon-
"A discussion of what this interest is will be found in Barnes v. Rea (19o8)
219 Pa. St. 287, 293, 68 Ati. 836.
" Corbin, op. cit., 66o.
1 Richardson v. Hardwick (1882) io6 U. S. 252, I Sup. Ct. 213.
" In Barton v. Thaw, supra, the defendant claimed that the option constituted
a vested interest in the land which would take the case out of the rule against
perpetuities. But the court held that in order to do this the option would have
to give a present fixed right of future enjoyment; that the option gave the
privilege (and power) to acquire the right, but not the right itself; that the
interest created by the right was not vested, but contingent.
'Abbott, Leases and the Rule against Perpetuities (1918) 27 YAIE LAW
JouRNAL, 878, 886; the option in gross, hanging over the owner, discourages
improvements in and expenditures on the property; the lessee's option encour-
ages him to improve.
11 Gray, The Rule against Perpetuities (3d ed. 1915) sec. 526b.
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ditioned power, to give him an absolute .interest in the land, is appar-
ently a vested limited interest. And that his option alone does not
give him .2 0  However we may designate his interest in the land, we
may not call that interest vested. It is at least no better than con-
tingent until he has exercised his power. In this respect the position
of the option-holder is not unlike that of the contingent remainder-
man in such a devise as : "Blackacre to A for life, remainder to B if B
marry," or indeed, "if B plant a rose bush on the testator's grave."
Both B and the option-holder must remain without a vested interest
in the respective premises until a specified act has been done, a legal
power exercised. The doing of that act, the exercise of that power,
may be wholly within the sole volition of either; but until its exercise
the interest does not vest.2
G. E. W.
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF ONE'S OWN DEBT
In a recent discussion in the JOURNAL as to the effect of a new
promise upon the running of the statute of limitations it was not
necessary to determine whether a change in the statute affected only
the remedy and hence did not run counter to constitutional objections.'
This vexed problem was presented in Gilbert v. Selleck (1919, Conn.)
io6 AtI. 439, where the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors decided
that the statute, in the case of a contract obligation, does not destroy
the debt but merely takes away the remedy, and that one has no "prop-
erty" in the bar of the statute, thus distinguishing a debt from realty
or chattels where the "property" passes and both "legal title" and "real
ownership" become vested by the running of the statute. The Court
therefore held that even after the statute had run the legislature might
provide an additional period during which suit could be brought upon a
contract of indemnity.
The only direct authority cited by the Court is the mooted case of
Campbell v. Holt,2 decided by a bare majority in the United States
Supreme Court.3 It is surprising that the opinion in the Connecticut
case does not indicate how great is the divergence of opinion upon
- But might not a leasehold interest be such a "vested limited interest," so as to
bring the lessee with option to purchase within Gray's language?
'Washburn, Real Property (6th ed. 19o2) secs. 1555, 556. See also Tiffany,
Future Interests (1913) 29 L. QUART. REv. 290, 298-301.
I (igig) 28 YAiL LAw JOURNAL, 817.
2 (1885) 115 U. S. 620, 6 Sup. Ct. 209.
'The only other authority cited is a dictum by Judge Henry Wade Rogers in
Re Sal",on (1917, C. C. A. 2d) 249 Fed. 300. In this case the court held that
a part payment made by an insolvent "takes the debt out of the statute of
limitations" so as to make it a provable debt in bankruptcy proceedings, over-
ruling L. Hand, J. (1916, S. D. N. Y.) 239 Fed. 413.
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the point, nor does it refer to the many criticisms of Campbell v. Holt.4
Among other critics of that case, Mr. Justice Holmes, while on the
Massachusetts bench, stated that the repeal of the statute even in the
case of a debt required "the property of one person to be given to
another."5  In another connection he has attempted a yet more direct
analogy between a chose in action and a chattel by assimilating the
sale of a horse to the assignment of a money claim.6 So far as pre-
cedents go, however, while there seems to be a complete unanimity of
opinion that the amending statute cannot touch the case of chattels
after the original statute has run without running afoul of the con-
stitutional restrictions, 7 yet the cases are in hopeless conflict as to the
effect of such an amendment in the case of a chose in action.8
Is there sound basis for a distinction between choses and chattels
in this regard? It may be admitted at once that we all sense a differ-
ence. The conception of A in possession of B's horse does not strike
us as strange while the same cannot be said of the conception of C
in possession of his own debt owed to D. But is there a difference
here justifying divergent legal results? Are the legal relations of A
to B and B to A so unlike those of C to D and D to C as to require A
to be treated differently than C and B than D? It is submitted, on
the contrary, that the relations are so nearly identical as logically to
require similar rulings in the absence of a compelling reason of policy.
See Ames, 3 Select Essays (199o) 569 that Campbell v. Holt "stands almost
alone" and Chambers v. Gallagher (1i1) 177 Calif. 704, 171 Pac. 931, that the con-
trary holding is supported "by the almost universal course of decisions in the
United States," citing decisions from twenty states. It is said that the doctrine
of Campbell v. Holt "is undoubtedly technically correct but is opposed to the
great weight of authority." Wood, Limitations (4th ed. 1916) 49.
'Danforth v. Groton Water Co. (190) 178 Mass. 472, 476, 59 N. E. 1033.
'Portuguese-American Bank v. Welles (1916) 242 U. S. 7, 37 Sup. Ct. 3;
and COMMENT (1917) 26 YAIE LAW JOURNAL, 305. Cf. (1915) 24 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 590. We often think of a chose in action as a physical thing, but in
reality it is an aggregate of rights, privileges, powers and immunities of the
creditor of which the more important correlatives (duties, etc.) are in the debtor.
But it must also be remembered that when A owns a physical thing he has only
rights, etc. against X, Y, and Z. Cf. (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 721, 730.
'See Chapin v. Freeland (1886) 142 Mass. 383, 8 N. E. 128; Bryan v. Weems
(1856) 29 Ala. 423; Fears, Admr. v. Sykes (1858) 35 Miss. 633. For references
to cases collected, see note 8, infra.
8In accord with Campbell v. Holt, see Keller's Admr. v. McHuffman (1879)
15 W. Va. 64; Orman v. Van Arsdell (1904) 12 N. M. 344, 78 Pac. 48. Contra,
Chambers v. Gallagher, supra, citing many decisions; Bigelow v. Bemis (1861,
Mass.) 2 Allen, 486; Brown v. Parker (1871) 28 Wis. 21. The cases are col-
lected in 17 R. C. L. 675; 25 Cyc. 988; 12 C. J. 1225. The situation is complicated
when the debtor is a municipality. There the rule appears to be that the amend-
ment is valid since the municipality is not to be treated as an individual but as
a branch of the government. Jackson Hill Coal & Coke Co. v. Board of Comrs.
(1014) 181 Ind. 335, 1O4 N. E. 497; State v. Seattle (91o) 57 Wash. 602, 107
Pal 827 and authorities collected in 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1188, note.
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We have been shown that courts were loath, until compelled by
business necessity, to concede the assignability of a chose in action
because there could be no manual tradition of that chose.9 It would
seem that the same attitude is at bottom responsible for the distinction
attempted in these cases.'10
Even before the statute has run A has a complex of legal relations
in the horse, so that as against all persons except B and those claiming
under him, A has all the elements of "ownership." As it was anciently
expressed, A had the "property" in the horse while B had only
a "right of property."'1  This is true whether the original taking was
tortious or not.12  A is, however, under a duty to B to return the
horse if B so elects, while B has a right to a judgment against A for
the horse or its value. So B has power with the aid of a court to
divest A of such legal interest as A has obtained by his possession and
claim of ownership, while A is under a corresponding liability to lose
such interest. And while B anciently had no power of transfer to a
third party X, he may now transfer to X his interest in the horse
though it is still in A's possession." When the statute of limitations
has run, A's duty and liability to B cease. And quite properly a statute
which thereafter creates a similar duty and liability in A to B, is held
to deprive A of his "property" without due process of law. C likewise
'2 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 19o5) 226; (1917) 26
YALE LAw JOURNAL, 305.
" A distinction is attempted between cases of title by prescription and cases of
limitation'affecting the remedy only. "But, probably through failure to, at all
times, appreciate the distinction between limitation and prescription, many
authorities assume that it is as impossible to revive a lost remedy as to restore
a lost right." (877) 4 CENT. L. Joo. 412, approved in (1879) I Am. Dec. 534,
note. But why label one case "prescription" and the other "limitation"? Cf.
Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, (x916) 29 HARv. L. R v. 816, 817:
'What happens, for example, upon a so-called transfer of title to real property
from A to B is, that the rights and other jural relations of A in relation to his
fellowmen with respect to the object transferred, are extinguished or divested
and that B becomes invested with similar though not necessarily identical rights
and other jural relat;ons. Whether in a given case A and B, either singly or
acting in cooperation, can do acts to which the law attaches such legal conse-
quences seems to be purely a question of positive law. In this respect it does
not seem possible to recognize that the transfer or assignment of a chose in
action involves anything fundamentally different from what is involved in the
transfer of a chose in possession."
Brian, C. J., Y. B. 6 Hen. VII, 9-4 discussed in Ames, op. cit., 541, 555. See
also Holmes, The Common Law (1881) 2o6, 241; and Bordwell, Property in
Chattels (1916) 29 HARv. L. Rxv. 374.
'
2 Jefferies v. Great Western Ry. Co. (1856) 5 El. & B1. 8o; Fletcher v. Cole
(1852) 26 Vt. 170; Demick v. Chapman (1814, N. Y.) ii Johns. 132; Anderson
v. Gouldberg (1892) 51 Minn.- 294, 53 N. W. 636. Contra, Turley v. Tucker
(i86o) 6 Mo. 583. See cases collected in Brantly, Personal Property (i8gi) sec.
144.
' Ames, loc. cit., citing the ancient authorities.
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before the running of the statute has almost complete dominion of his
various assets, but he is under a duty to pay D and subject to a liability
that D with court aid will use his assets to pay the debt. And whereas
anciently D had no power of assignment he may now assign to y.14
And here, too, the expirition of the statutory period leaves C owing
no duty of payment to D and under no liability to D.' 5 Here, too, how
can a duty and liability on C's part be created by act of the legislature
without the taking away from one man and the giving to another
prohibited by the Federal Constitution as well as by most State con-
stitutions.1 The analogy to the situation existing between A and B
would possibly be clearer if C were not the original debtor to D, as
if D assigned to C by way of security his claim against E for money
due, and C later refused to reassign to D relying on the statute ;17 but
whether one end of the chose is E or is C, the analogy is so close that
the constitutional restriction should apply alike to either case.
The fact that C by new promise or part payment can create a duty
similar to that formerly owed to D, has been relied on as justifying
the legislative act so far as C is concerned. 8 But whether we think
of the new promise as "reviving" the old debt or as itself creating an
obligation, we must not forget that it is the act of the debtor which
is the operative act.'9 He exercises his own volition in making the
"
4Ames, loc. cit.; Cook, loc. cit.
"The statement in the text is made advisedly, notwithstanding the frequent
statements that the debtor has a "moral duty" to pay, sufficient to support a
new promise. Legally a duty only exists as a correlative to a right in some one
else, which right is enforceable by court action or self help. Cf. Ames, loc. cit.
"The provision of the Connecticut Constitution is found in Art. 1, sec. 9.
Here as elsewhere the use of the label "property" clouds instead of clarifies the
discussion. The courts following Campbell v. Holt are in effect restricting the
term to interests in physical objects, whereas the ordinary usage, as for instance
in the settlement of estates, would include interests in choses in action. Does
not property mean anything of value to the individual? If so, any legal relation
is in effect property. This but emphasizes the point that the term is too inclusive
to be of assistance in solving most disputed points. A liberty or privilege to
contract where on6 pleased was recently held to be a "property right." Auburn
Draying Co. v. Wardell (1919, N. Y.) 124 N. E. 97.
' Yet the Massachusetts Supreme Court held by only a bare majority that the
rule as to chattels should be applied to (the privilege of) a seat upon the New
York Stock Exchange. Currier v. Studley (1893) 159 Mass. 17, 33 N. E. 709.
"Among others, by justice Miller in Campbell v. Holt, supra.
" The correct analysis would seem to be that given in Anson, Contracts (Cor-
bin's ed. igig) 156, viz., that the operative facts which give rise to the legal
relation upon which suit is brought are old debt plus new promise and that
without either the right enforceable in the suit does not exist. See also (ig1g)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817. So L. Hand, J. says that the orthodox theory
that the debt is still existing is "a theory full of vicious casuistry," but this
did not trouble the upper court which refers to the plea of the statute, as a
personal privilege which may be waived. Re Salmon, supra. But one may
waive a great many things, even an assertion of complete ownership, by non-
action in a lawsuit.
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new promise, which is quite a different thing from the legislative act,
when we come to consider who is doing the act of. "depriving." Nor
does the rule of law that a tort cannot be revived by new promise or
part payment help. This rule, in itself of doubtful logic and only to
be justified upon the theory that it is against public policy to keep
alive and give currency to tort claims, does not state a distinction be-
tween chattels and choses but between the forms of action, that is,
between assumpsit as distinguished from other forms of action.
2
0
In view of the varying attitudes of courts towards the statute of
limitations we might rest our conclusion on logic alone, on the ground
that there was no settled public policy on the question. Courts, while
recognizing the value of "statutes of repose" in the abstract, yet have
seen only the defendant trying to evade what seems to them a just obli-
gation, on the ground of lapse of time. Yet there is clearly a public
policy which recognizes that it is in general the weak case which is
delayed, that courts should not be compelled to resurvey old scenes
blurred by the passage of time or reopen old sores, in short that there
comes a time when bygones must be bygones, "that even the weariest
river flows somewhere to the sea."21 Now who is to meet with more
favor, A who has stolen B's horse, or C who borrowed money from D ?
It seems clear that there are more chances that the possessor of chattels
is an active wrongdoer than the one who owes a debt. The latter's
opportunities for wrongdoing, other than the mere inaction involved
in non-payment, are limited to fraud and duress. Surely the latter
should obtain repose by the lapse of time as well as the former.
22
' This rule has been applied to debt on bond. Ludlow v. Van Camp (1823)
7 N. J. L. 113. Also to debt on judgment (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817.
A new promise has been held effective where the tort is waived and suit is
brought in assumpsit. Moses v. Taylor (i888,'Dist. Col.) 6 Mackey, 255; contra,
Nelson v. Patterson (19o7) 229 III. 24o, 82 N. E. 229. The reason given for the
rule is that a new promise cannot "amount to a new tort." Goodwyn v. Good-
wyn (1854) 16 Ga. 114, 117. It has been said that no tort claim is assignable.
Gardner v. Adams (1834, N. Y.) 12 Wend. 297. But the general rule is that
claims for injuries except those for tort to the person are assignable. Comegys
v. Vasse (1828, U. S.) i Pet. 193, 213; Rice v. Stone (1861, Mass.) i Allen,
566. If old debt plus new promise will create a legal obligation, so should old
tort plus new promise, except where public policy intervenes, i. e., except in cases
of claims for tort to the person. Cf. Patterson v. Breitag (1893) 88 Iowa, 418,
55 N. W. 86, declining to enforce a note and mortgage given to satisfy a barred
claim for criminal conversation.
'Cf. Justice Story in Bell v. Morrison (1828, U.' S.) i Pet. 351, 36o, 362. In
Koyl v. Lay (1916) 194 Mo. App. 291, 187 S. W. 279, the court criticised plaintiffs
for waiting until all the other witnesses were dead. Statutes of limitation them-
selves do deprive one of property, but they had met the approval of the general
community before the time of written constitutions and are hence due process
of law. Cooley, Cotstitutional Limitations (7th ed. 1903) 520.
n C appears to have an advantage over A as to the time when the statute
starts to run, if A's original possession of the chattel was not tortious, since the
statute does not run until the possession is adverse. Smith v. Townes's Admr.
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There is, however, one consideration that at first sight seems im-
portant, namely, the interest of the innocent third person. Should not
M who has purchased the horse of A be protected? Yes, though if
this protection was of chief importance we ought to protect M without
reference to some arbitrary length of time which has passed since A
had violated a duty to B. M is relying on A's possession rather than
on the passage of time since A's breach of duty. But at most this is
simply an added argument for the holding as to chattels and is not
itself an argument against the application of the same rule to choses.And yet does M deserve protection more than N who is dealing with
C on the basis of the latter's present credit? Though N's reliance upon
the present situation is based upon general credit rather than upon the
possession of specific articles, yet at bottom N's position appears similar
to M's and from the standpoint of public policy he should be accorded
like protection to that accorded M.
This is not the place to discuss in detail the conflict of laws as affect-
ing the running of the statute further than to suggest that here, too,
chattels and choses should be treated alike. And it would seem that
the situation discloses no real difficulty. D may have a right against
C enforcible in one state and a similar right enforcible during a differ-
ent period in another state. Although this is often pointed to as
demonstrating that the statute affects only the remedy it means no
more than that D has more than one road to reach his goal. Yet after
time has closed those roads and C no longer owes a duty of payment
to D, C's privilege and immunity as respects D should be and according
to the better reasoned decisions are respected no matter what state C
happens to be in.23
In criticising the ground of the decision in Gilbert v. Selleck the
writer does not assert that the decision may be incorrect. For there
an action had been pending in the Federal Court and was finally dis-
missed in that court for lack of jurisdiction. The amendments passed
by the legislature pending that suit provided that where an action had
been dismissed in the Federal Court for lack of jurisdiction suit might
be started in the State Court within one year after such dismissal. 24
(1814, Va.) 4 Munf. 191. But neither does it run in C's case until there is abreach of duty, which is apparently all that "adverse" holding means. Under
most statutes, also, the time does not run while the cause of action is concealed,
or as it is sometimes put, while the adverse holding is not open and notorious.Gatlin v. gaut (1go6) 6 Indian Terr. 254, 91 S. W. 35; State ex rel. McClure v.
Northrop (1919, Conn.) io8 Atl.
'Shelby v. Guy (1826, U. S.) ii Wheat. 361, 371, 6 L. ed. 495; Brown v.Parker (1871) 28 Wis. 21, 27; Pear's Admr. v. Sykes (1858) 35 Miss. 633.
Cf. COMMa1ENT (I919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 492.
"
4 To make assurance trebly certain, the legislature passed three amendments
to this effect, one each in 1913, 1915 and 1917. During each of these sessionsplaintiff's attorney was a member of the legislature and of the particular com-
mittee which had the amendments in charge. Defendants were justified in
admitting that there was no opportunity for the operation of the rule that,
where possible, statutes are not to be construed as operating retroactively.
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Actually the suit in question was started before the final decision in
the federal suit. Now it is well settled that before the statute has run
the legislature may extend the time2 5 and also that where 'suit is
brought before the statute has run amendments may later be made,
such as increasing the damages claimed or changing the mere form of
action.26 In effect it means that A's and C's duty and liability exist
so long as there is a suit pending, and that while such duty and liability
exist they may be extended by the legislature, which is obviously a
situation quite other than the recreation of a duty and liability after
they have ceased to exist.27  It is but little if any stretch to apply the
amendment theory to the transfer of a suit from one court to another.2 8
But such application should be made alike in the case of chattels as
well as choses between which there is for limitation purposes no real
distinction.
C. E. C.
THE DOCTRINE OF MERGER AS APPLIED TO COMMERCIAL TRUSTS
The modern commercial or real estate trust, so frequently the subject
of subtle legal refinements, yet definitely sanctioned by law and exten-
sively employed in practice, has recently become exposed to a new
complication from a most unexpected source, the ancient and abstract
doctrine of merger.
In the case of Cunningham v. Bright," the sole trustee of a real
estate trust acquired by indorsement all of the transferable shares
representing the equitable interest in the trust. Subsequently the real
estate standing in his name as trustee was attached by his personal
creditor. The attachment was upheld, notwithstanding the ostensible
trust, on three independent grounds. Two of these grounds2 were
manifestly sufficient and do not now concern us. The third was that
I Davis v. Mills (19o3) 194 U. S. 451, 457, 24 Sup. Ct. 692; Danforth v. Groton
Water Co. (igoi) 178 Mass. 472, 59 N. E. 1033.
'Moses v. Tayler (i88o, Dist. Col.) 6 Mackey, 255; Frederichsen v. Renard
(1918) 247 U. S. 207, 38 Sup. Ct. 450. See COMMENT (x9i8) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 1053; (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 693. The cases are collected
in 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) :259.
' See discussion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Danforth v. Groton Water Co.,
supra. In Dunbar v. R. R. (19o2) 18i Mass. 383, 63 N. M. 916, criticised in
(19o2) I6 HARv. L. REv., he goes still further. Cf. Fleming v. Railroad (19Ol)
128 N. C. 80, 38 S. E. 253.
' In the present case the federal suit had dragged on for eight years and
for three years more on appeal, and the plaintiff may therefore be entitled to
little sympathy for such delay. Yet where the plaintiff has instituted suit before
the statute has run, the delay is partly the court's fault and another court is not
justified in penalizing the plaintiff for delays which the first court could control.
S(1917) 228 Mass. 385, 117 N. E. gog.
2 First, the trust was merely a device for the evasion of attachments; second,
the equitable interest, as entitling the debtor to a present conveyance of the legal
estate, was itself subject to attachment under Mass. Rev. Law, 19o2, ch. 178,
sec. I.
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by virtue of the union of the entire legal and equitable interests in a
single ownership, the equitable interest was merged in the legal and
the trust was thereby extinguished. 3
Ought this principle to apply to the bona fide acquisition by a trus-
tee, in the regular course of business, of all the transferable shares of
the trust? At its very origin the common-law conception of merger
was founded, not upon considerations of policy, but upon what accord-
ing to the artificial reasoning of the time was regarded as an inexor-
able logical necessity.4 Consequently, as early as the time of Lord
Coke,5 the judges were alert to find avenues of escape from the appli-
cation of the doctrine, and found them, as is well known, in the case of
"intervening estates" serving to hold apart the otherwise "coalescent"
interests.6
The trust doctrine of merger is, however, notwithstanding the
language of certain cases, 7 essentially different in its origin and char-
acter. Like the entire law of trusts, it is purely a product of courts
of equity. It is based, not upon artificial reasoning, but upon the
recognition of a fact, namely that one person as cestui que trust can
not invoke the aid of a court of equity against himself as trustee, and
that without this power there can be no trust.8 Equity is not "follow-
ing the law" in this matter, for it is dealing with a situation without
parallel in the common law. Nor is it pursuing any equitable policy
except the policy of recognizing facts in deciding between otherwise
indifferent claims. Thus if the controversy is between the paternal
and maternal heirs of A who has inherited a legal fee from his father
and a corresponding equitable fee from his mother, there is no con-
ceivable ground of policy for holding that the trust must cease when
the legal and equitable interests meet. In fact the trust has ceased,
and the best equity that the court can find is to recognize this fact in
deciding between the equally unmeritorious paternal and maternal
heirs.9
The merger in fact upon which equity thus proceeds is present in
equal measure wherever a partial or total legal interest meets a partial
'Cunningham v. Bright, supra.
' 2 Blackstone, Commentaries (I8th ed. 1823) 181.
"Mergers were never favoured at law, and still less in equity." 2 Coke,
Littleton (Ist Am. ed. 1853) sec. 338b. "Mergers are odious in equity." Gibson
v. Crehore (1826, Mass.) 3 Pick. 475, 482.
'Blackstone, op. cit.; Fearne, Remainders (3d Am. ed. 1826) 339; Johnson
v. Johnson (x863, Mass.) 7 Allen, x96.
' See Bolles v. State Trust Co. (1876) 27 N. J. Eq. 3o8; Asche v. Asche (1889)
113 N. Y. 232, 21 N. E. 70.
8 Goodright v. Welles (1781, K. B.) 2 Doug. 771, 778; Greene v. Greene (i89i)
125 N. Y. 5o6, 26 N. E. 739; I Perry, Trusts (6th ed. 1911) sec. 13.
'See Goodright v. Welles, supra.
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or total equitable interest in the same ownership.Y0 Nevertheless in
numerous cases, for the protection of those beneficiaries whose interests
have not merged, equity ignores the partial merger, and insists upon
the administration of the trust as a subsisting entirety. It is not
enough to say to a partial beneficiary in such a case that his own share
in the trust would be unaffected by the merger of other shares. He
is entitled to have the trust preserved in its entirety, and all the well
considered decisions accord him this right." Similarly all mergers,
whether total or partial, are ignored for the purpose of effecting a
desirable result,'1 2 such as to avoid a miscarriage of the intention of
the creator of the trust,'13 to avoid a miscarriage of the intention with
which the merging transaction took place,14 to avoid wanton prejudice
to third parties who have acquired interests in the property,15 and
even to avoid a wanton prejudice to the person in whose hands the
merger has occurred.'
The "legal" doctrine of merger, on the other hand, has been said to
be automatic and inexorable,' 7 but this dictum, in so far as it is true
at all, is manifestly applicable only to the merger of legal estates, and
not to the treatment by courts of law of the merger of equitable with
legal estates. The latter subject is in its origin within the exclusive
province of courts of equity. They alone created and recognized
trusts, and they alone could adjudicate upon their destruction.' When,
"0 Weeks v. Frankel (igio) 197 N. Y. 304, go N. E. 969; Wade v. Paget (1784,
Eng. Ch.) i Bro. C. C. 363; Bolles v. State Trust Co., supra; Butler v. Godley
(1826) 12 N. C. 94; Swisher v. Swisher (1912) 157 Iowa, 56, 137 N. W. lO76;
Woodward v. James (1889) 115 N. Y. 346, 22 N. E. 15o; Mason v. Mason's Ex'rs
(1845, N. Y.) 2 Sandf. Ch. 432; Wilson v. Harrold (igig, Ill.) 123 N. E. 563.
"Asche v. Asche, supra; Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College (905)
1O3 App. Div. 327, 93 N. Y. Supp. 92; Woodward v. James, supra; Mason v.
Mason's Ex'rs, supra; Hildreth v. Eliot (1829, Mass.) 8 Pick. 293; Phillips
v. Brydges (1796, Eng. Ch.) 3 Ves. 120. Contra, Weeks v. Frankel, supra; Wade
v. Paget, supra; Bolles v. State Trust Co., supra; Wills v. Cooper, supra;,
Butler v. Godley, supra; Swisher v. Swisher, supra; Wilson v. Harrold, supra.
" "Mergers take place when a greater and less estate come together in the same
person, and when there is no reason for their longer existence as separate
estates." Sherlock v. Thompson (1912) 167 Iowa, I, 148 N. W. lO35.
"
3Hildreth v. Eliot, supra; Highland Park Mfg. Co. v. Steele (1916, C. C. A.
4th) 232 Fed. io. See Bowlin v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. (1918, Ark.)
198 S. W. 288.
"
4McCreary v. Coggeshall (igo6) 74 S. C. 42, 53 S. E. 978. An express agree-
ment was held sufficient to prevent merger for "if this intention has been ex-
pressed, it controls." Agnew v. Charlotte C. & A. R. Co. (1885) 24 S. C. 18;
Starr v. Ellis (1822, N. Y.) 6 Johns. Ch. 393; Forbes v. Moffatt (181I, Eng. Ch.)
18 Ves. 384.
'
5Hildreth v. Eliot, supra; Woodward v. James, supra; Lipscomb v. Goode
(1899) 57 S. C. 182, 35 S. E. 493; Forbes v. Moffatt, supra.
"Phillips v. Brydges, supra; Sherlock v. Thompson, supra.
Lewin, Trusts (8th ed. 1888) 726.
"Selby v. Alston (1797, Eng. Ch.) 3 Ves. 339.
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therefore, courts of law have come to deal with the question, as in
the determination of the validity of attachments or of claims of dower,
they have had merely to answer the purely equitable question, Does
a trust exist or does it not? In answering this question courts of
law should, as they appear uniformly to do, follow implicitly the
doctrines of equity.19
How ought these doctrines to be applied to the case of the business
trust? It is not contended that the sole trustee acquiring, even in the
honest course of business, all the beneficial shares has any personal
standing in equity to demand immunity from attachment or the in-
cumbrance of dower, although even he has at least the equity of any
party in the same situation clearly expressing the intention not to
effect a merger.2 0 Nor is it to be supposed that if prior to the inter-
vention of such an incumbrance the shares, or some of them, should
pass into other hands, the trust would not be perfectly reinstated ac-
cording to its original character. But in general the clear intention of
the creator of an active trust like this is protected from frustration
through merger.21 The organizers of the business trust have mani-
fested unmistakably the intention to establish, on a secure basis and for
an indefinite duration, an active business under a continuous manage-
ment, combining therewith the advantages of free transferability of
the beneficial interests and a continuity of legal ownership. They
have probably provided a particular and exclusive mode for the termi-
nation of the trust. It is no less immaterial than if they had in fact
incorporated, who acquires the ownership of the shares. The frus-
tration of such an enterprise through a purely formal concurrence of
estates should be at least as repugnant to equity as is the premature
termination, through merger, of an active maintenance trust.22
But equity will also discountenance a merger which is the occasion
of an unnecessary injury.23 The shares of the trust are likely at any
moment to pass again from the hands of the trustee into general circu-
lation. It is impracticable for purchasers to watch the records for
intervening attachments, nor is it just that this should be required.
Moreover, inchoate rights of dower and courtesy do not appear of
record, and the inquiry with respect to them, at best very difficult,
becomes quite hopeless after a succession of transfers. Prospective
share-holders have indeed no vested right to the preservation of the
trust, but the avoidance of the peril of extensive public deception is
McCreary v. Coggesliall, supra, approved in Highland Park Mfg. Co., supra.
Cf., Asche v. Asche, supra, and Hunt v. Hunt (1833, Mass.) 14 Pick. 374 (on
law side) with Hildreth v. Eliot, supra, and Woodward v. James, supra, (on
equity side). Cf. also Bolles v. State Trust Co., supra, with Wills v'. Cooper.
See note 14, supra.
'See cases cited in note 13, supra.
'See Hildreth v. Eliot, supra.
' Cases cited in notes 15 and 16, supra.
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certainly a substantial equitable consideration, when thrown into the
scales against a purely fortuitous coincidence of estates.
24
It is submitted, therefore, that well recognized equitable grounds
exist for disregarding a purely fortuitous merger of estates in the
bona fide transfer of trust shares, and that these considerations are
equally relevant at law and in equity.
A permanent provision for two or more trustees is, however, always
possible. Unfortunately some judicial decisions and dicta2 have
tended to support a wide-spread professional belief that even this pre-
caution may not prevent a destructive merger. Manifestly all of the
considerations above mentioned are at least equally applicable to the
case of several trustees. In fact, however it is submitted, we do not
reach the question of equitable relief from merger at all, for the
reason that the doctrine itself is quite impossible of logical application
to the case of a multiple trusteeship.
Assume that A, B, and C are trustees, with shares to the amount of
twenty each in the hands of B, C, and D respectively. So long as D
is interested the partial merger here involved will clearly not be
recognized. Now let D sell all his shares to A. Each trustee is now
the legal owner of one undivided third and the equitable owner of one
undivided third.
Figurative refinements concerning the "submersion" of a lesser estate
in a greater have no proper place in the problem of the merger of trusts.
Nevertheless they appear occasionally in the cases
26 and doubtless must
still be reckoned with. If equity is to extend to a subject-matter exclu-
sively its own a scholasticism which belongs solely to the common law
in a quite different context, it may be presumed at least to observe the
common-law limitations upon the doctrine. At common law the con-
verging estates must be coextensive, relating to an identical subject
of ownership.27 But the problem of identifying the respective un-
divided legal and equitable moieties of the several trustees, considered
merely as parallel systems of estates, becomes devoid of meaning, for
how can the parts be coterminous when their essential nature precludes
the possibility of assigning them a boundary?
But the more enlightened and better authorized basis of the doctrine
of merger of trusts is expressed in the simple proposition, "no person
can sue a subpoena against himself."28 Where, however, A, B, and C
See Sherlock v. Thompson, supra.
' Greene v. Greene, supra; Wills v. Cooper, supra; Swisher v. Swisher, supra.
See also Healey v. Alston (1852) 25 Miss. i9o, in which, however, there probably
existed a positive intention to terminate the trust. In none of these cases is
the difference in principle between the case of one trustee and that of two or
more considered.
^'See Hopkinson v. Duntas (i86o) 42 N. H. 296.
'Donald v. Plumb (1831) 8 Conn. 446.
Z i Perry, op. cit., sec. 13.
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are trustees for A, B, and C, A can sue a subpoena against B and C,
and he may, according to a well established practice, join himself
formally as co-defendant. And it is a remedy against B and C which
his substantive rights require. Observe that we do not reach the
question of merger until we have determined what A's equitable right
is, to what it extends, and against whom it may be enforced, assuming
that it may have a separate existence. This interest is not a beneficial
interest merely in his own undivided share of the legal estate. It
entitles him to a participation in the benefits of the joint management
of the entire property, irrespective of any division into legal moieties.
If he sought and were permitted to terminate the trust, something
more than his own separate act would be required. He could not
single out his own legal moiety, but must obtain a release from the
others, or a conveyance from all three.2" Thus there is no pro rata
apportionment, moiety by moiety, of legal to equitable interest.
Every share carries with it an equitable right to a portion of the rents
and profits of the legal estate in its entirety. The trustees are liable,
irrespective of the relative size of their legal moieties, for the losses
resulting from their dereliction.3" It is therefore quite immaterial
that all the trustees are beneficiaries and all the beneficiaries are trus-
tees. All are trustees, not for themselves only, but also for each other,
with respect to the management and enjoyment, the enforcement, and
the termination of the trust.3 1
It is clear, therefore, that if the doctrine of merger may properly be
applied to commercial trusts, the provision of more than one trustee
should protect against the destructive consequences of a merger.3 2
TRANSFER V. ENDORSEMENT
Of course an endorser without recourse does not escape all duties
to his endorsee, as is illustrated by the decision in Miller v. Stewart
(I9I9, Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S. W. 565. He is still liable to his trans-
feree if the "maker's" signature proves, later, to be forged. But one
may be excused for needing a reminder of the fact. The concept of
transfer1 of a negotiable instrument has in common thought become so
-Chapin v. First Universalist Society (857, Mass.) 8 Gray, 580.
'Hayes v. Hall (9o5) 188 Mass. 510, 74 N. E. 935.
'A devise was made to four children in trust to hold and divide the rents
and profits among them, with a division of the principal at such time as all should
agree upon a sale. This was held to constitute an active trust such as to prevent
a partition without the consent of all. All four children were collectively
obligated to carry on the active management for the benefit of each. Harris v.
Harris (1903) 205 Pa. St. 460, 55 Atl. 30.
'Accord in opinion, although other beneficiaries existed in addition to those
who were also trustees. Burbach v. Burbach (905) 217 II1. 54, 75 N. E. 519.
1Transfer is used in this paper as a general term to denote the "passing of
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overlaid with the idea of endorsement and of endorser's liability, that
it is easy to forget these other, often quite distinct features of a
transfer on which litigation sometimes turns. And it is singularly
difficult to find in the books a discussion in which all the major aspects
of transfer are brought into juxtaposition and comparison.
(i) The first and simplest thing such a transfer may do is to pass
to the transferee such claims against the obligors and such title
against prior owners as the transferor himself enjoyed-to operate,
in other words, as the assignment of a chose in action. For that,
neither consideration nor endorsement is necessary; neither capacity
of the transferor nor legality of purpose would seem to be. Mere
delivery of an unendorsed order instrument, by a minor payee, as a
gift, made to bribe a public official, would suffice to put the transferee
into the minor's shoes.2 The case stands much as would the gratuitous
transfer of a chattel.
(2) A new element is introduced if the note transferred is not
merely given, but is sold for a price. A price is good consideration
to support a warranty.3 And in the absence of agreement to the
contrary, the transferor by sale is held, like any vendor of a chattel,
"impliedly to warrant" that the thing sold is what it purports to be :'
a genuine note with genuine endorsements, in the terms indicated on
title," the divesting in an old holder of his beneficial legal relations concerning
an instrument, and the investing of the new holder with similar relations.
Assignment is used to mean the transfer, substantially, of just the relations the
transferor himself enjoyed. Negotiation is used to indicate a transfer which
"cuts off equities," which creates in the taker wider and fuller powers, privileges
and rights than were enjoyed by the transferor. Sale means transfer for a
price, to which "implied warranties" will attach by operation of law. Endorser's
contract refers to the legal duties laid on a person by virtue of his endorsement
of a note or bill, as distinguished from those incurred by a sale of the instrument.
'That is, substantially. But the infant would still have power to revoke the
gift. The donee would lack the power which his donor (as long as he possessed
the instrument) had, to create a holder in due course. And the donee would
by the better rule, in a suit against the maker, lack the presumption of ownership
which the payee would enjoy. Swanby v. Northern State Bank (1912) 15o Wis.
572, 137 N. W. 763; Wade v. Boone (1914) 184 Mo. App. 88, 168 S. W. 360;
Sloan v. Gilmzore (1914, Tex. Civ. App.) 167 S. W. io8g. The recent cases
contra, Callahan v. Louisville Dry Goods Co. (igo) 140 Ky. 712, 131 S. W. 995,
and Woodward v. Donavan (1912) 167 Ill. App. 503, are reasoned either poorly
or not at all, save for Roy v. Duff (1915) 170 Iowa, 3i9, 152 N. W. 6o6, which
in a dictum admits a presumption that the possessor is empowered and privileged
to sue for the ordcree.
'Even if N. I. L. secs. 28 and 52 do not limit secs. 65 and 30 so as to let in
the question of consideration in suits on warranties, it is believed clear that that
question should be open under sec. 196.
'These "implied warranties" are sets of legal relations (power to rescind, right
to damages, etc.) attached by the law to the transaction of sale. Nevertheless,
it is believed that they fall sufficiently under principles of contract to make
applicable the contract rules on illegality, capacity and consideration. Only the
last is discussed in the text.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
its face;5 free from defences for want of capacity;6 and that the
transferor has, and has by the sale exercised power to pass good
title to it ;7 and that he knows of no illegality or insolvency which
would render valueless any obligation on the instrument.8 In case of
forgery, in the signature of any "obligor" or in the chain of title;
in case of alteration, or incapacity--the law of sales applies. So in
the principal case. And that law applies irrespective of endorsement ;1o
what matters to a sale the form of the transfer? The question is: is
the "thing sold," are the legal relations vested by the sale in the vendee,
what they reasonably appeared to be, or are they not? And as in the
case of chattel-sale, it is believed that the vendee's knowledge of the
facts should bar recovery on "implied warranty.""
(3) But the transfer of negotiable paper may have that other con-
sequence which has given the paper its name: the rendering of the
taker a holder in due course: if, before an instrument fair on its face
was overdue, he has taken it for value, in good faith, and without
notice.1 2  To produce this result the transferor may have to sign his
name. But that in no way means that he must assume the contracts
of an endorser; even if the instrument reads to his order, his endorse-
ment "without recourse" will be as effective as a general endorsement,
'N. I. L. sec. 65 (W). It purports to carry rights against endorsers as well as
against the primary obligor.
'Ibid. (3).
" Ibid. (2) : "that he has good title to it." If this does not mean "power to
give good title" it is difficult to find reason for the provision. For if the taker
takes bona fide, he becomes a holder in due course, sustaining no damage and
needing no warranty; if he knows of a defect in title, there is no room for implied
warranty. And although the vendor's "having" good title may become operative
in the case suggested in sec. 49: if value is given before notice, but endorsement
not obtained till after-yet the vital thing is believed still to be: whether good
title has passed. Cf. the language of the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, sec. 35
(b), (d).
'Ibid. (4) While this section seems to be directed to the primary obligation,
it is believed to apply, like (i), to the endorsers' duties as well. Nor is it
believed that the- instrument need be wholly valueless, to enable suit to be
maintained.
'Would actual disaffirmance be a condition precedent to suit on the warranty?1 While an order instrument sold and delivered without endorsement is not
negotiated within the language of sec. 3o, and would thus seem excluded from
the warranties provided in sec. 65, it is believed that the warranties should and
would attach, and that resort to sec. 49 should be unnecessary. The right to
have the endorsement should give as full rights against the vendor as the endorse-
ment itself.
Cf. the law on inspection by the buyer of a chattel as to warranty of patent
defects. Williston, Sales (19o9) sec. 234. This result must follow, if the law
attaches implied warranties because of justifiable reliance by the buyer on the
seller.
'N. I. L. sec. 52.
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to create a bona fide holder ;la and the words "without recourse" ex-
pressly negative all endorser's duties.14
(4) The endorser's contract, then, although it runs so commonly in
men's minds in connection with the transfer of negotiable paper, is a
wholly severable thing. It may, or it may not, be added to a transfer.
A different, unusual contract, like that of guaranty, may be added in
its place.1 r And, for the endorser to come under a duty to his imme-
diate endorsee, all the elements of any contract must be present: capacity,
consideration, legality, form.1 6 Any or all of these may be absent,
and yet an assignment be operative; any or all but consideration-
value-may be absent from a valid negotiation. This severability, this
apartness of the endorser's contract, is emphasized by comparison of
notes and bills with other negotiable paper: bills of lading under the
Uniform Act. Such instruments know no contract of endorsement;
yet the vital features of negotiability they possess: transfer to a holder
in due course wipes out defences of the contract-obligor, wipes out
as well the title-claims of prior owners of the paper, both to the contract
and to the property it represents.
If the above analysis is sound, it should indicate something of the
nature of the transfer of bills and notes: exactly wherein such transfer
is not peculiar to itself, and exactly wherein it is; what the elements are
of its peculiarity; and what the facts are which operate to cause these
peculiar results. In regard to (i) mere assignment and (2) mere sale,
it is believed that useful, if not controlling, analogies are to be drawn
from the field of choses in action generally. In regard to (3) the
IIbid., sec. 38. But, as Ames pointed out, under sec. 65 an endorser without
recourse (as opposed to a transferor by mere delivery) would seem to be liable
on his warranties to subsequent holders of the instrument.
"But to negative any duty which is ordinarily assumed by signature on the
back of a note or bill, the words to be added will do well to be exceedingly
explicit. "I assign my right, title and interest in the within note" is not usually
held to exclude the assumption of an endorser's duties. This view has been
criticized. (i916) i5 MIcE. L. REv. 71; (191 6) 83 CENT. L. J. i9o. It may be
questioned whether the criticism does not allow technicality to outweigh sound
sense; in any case, it is out of harmony with the decided tendency of the courts
to find some sort of liability, if a man's name is on the instrument. So in the
instant case "without recourse on me in any way" did not exclude the "warranty
of genuineness."
'Indeed the only way of restricting the rights and powers of a transferee,
negativing even warranty or gift, is by writing on the back of the instrument
the requisite words of "endorsement"C-"for collection" or whatnot.
"Here should be noted that other peculiar feature of endorsement: that it
puts the endorser under warrantor's and endorser's duties to all subsequent
holders in due course. N. I. L. sec. 66. This warranty to sub-vendees, by
reason of endorsement, of course goes beyond the law of sales. Williston,
op. cit., sec. 244. It is the one element which endorsement without recourse
seems to have in common with unqualified endorsement. See note 13. As to the
sub-vendee, too, the matters of consideration and, in the ordinary case, of
legality, would be immaterial in this particular.
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creation of a holder in due course, the analogies to bills of lading
under the Act is striking and iristructive, and those to warehouse
receipts and again, to stock certificates, only slightly less so. Only
in regard to (4) the contracts entered into purely and solely by endorse-
ment, does the law of transfer of bills and notes become a complex of
rules wholly unto itself.
K. N. L.
EARMARKS OF THE TIMES
Law changes, adjusting to the times. It changes in the courts.1
This is not pleasant for the litigant whose foothold the adjustment
sweeps from under him. Nor is it pleasant for his counsel who sees
new law made overnight. But it is the fact; it helps little to deny it;
it is poor work building on "the first principle that nothing is true
which is disagreeable, and that we must not believe anything that is
'shocking,' no matter what the evidence may be." When the evidence
is given by the court itself, it should be the more convincing.2 In Kintz
v. Harriger (1919, Ohio) 124 N. E. 168, the court was asked to allow
an action for malicious prosecution against one who, perjuring himself,
had wilfully and maliciously given false testimony before the grand
jury, which evidence led to the indictment and trial of the plaintiff.
The court conceded that "the weight of precedent for a century and
more" was to the effect of absolute privilege in the defendant. 3 But
it was held unanimously that the action lay.
'Professor A. L. Corbin, The Law and the Judges (1914) 3 YALE REVIEW
(N. S.) 234; Judge Francis J. Swayze, The Growing Law (1915) 25 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, I; Judge John E. Young, The Law as an Expression of Com-
munity Ideals (1917) 27 ibid., I; see also (1918) ibid., 668.
'Another recent instance was the decision in Jones v. Hawkeye Covil. Men's
Ass. (1918, Iowa) 168 N. W. 305, over the able dissent of Weaver, J. "On the
whole," says the court of the line of the precedents, "they fairly sustain the
appellant's argument, and we face the responsibility of agreeing or disagreeing
with then,." (Italics the editor's.) The court proceeded to take the responsi-
bility of disagreeing. See (1918) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 193. Numerous cases
may be found where like-minded judges have, from the bench, given express
recognition of their own law-making function and of the reason of its exercise.
"Quicquid agant homines" said Lord Mansfield, "is the business of Courts,
and as the usages of society alter, the law must adapt itself to the various
situations of mankind." Barwell v. Brooks (1784, K. B.) 3 Doug. 371, 373. See
also Willes, C. J., in Davies v. Powell (1738, C. P.) Willes, 46, 51; Lord Cotten-
ham in Walworth v. Holt (1842, Eng. Ch.) 4 My. & C. 619, 635; Gibson, C. J.,
in Lyle v. Richards (823, Pa.) 9 S. & R. 322, 351. Other judges view their
business differently. "It is my wish and my comfort," said Lord Kenyon, "to
stand super antiquas vias. I cannot legislate; but by my industry I can discover
what our predecessors have done, and I will servilely tread in their steps."
Baucrinan v. Radenius (798, K. B.) 7 T. R. 663, 668. Yet even Lord Kenyon
found himself legislating. Goodisson v. Nunn (1792, K. B.) 4 T. R. 761.
'See Keeley v. Great N. Ry. (194) 156 Wis. I81, x45 N. W. 664; 4 B. R. C.
959.
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"Precedents are valuable for information, admonition, and as mile-
stones in the nation's progress. But they do not necessarily imply
the last word of wisdom. They are not always to be adopted. They
are quite frequently to be avoided. They are worth exactly what they
weigh in right and reason when applied to the particular circumstances
of each particular case. They must always have due regard to the
natural equities of each special case.
"It was an easy step from the dogma, the king can do no wrong,
to the corollary, the king's councilor, the king's chancellor, the court
can do no wrong. The courts are fallible, though some of us seem
fearful of admitting it. 4 The judicial records show that we have
reversed not only other courts, but we have reversed even ourselves,
and wisely, too; and so it will ever be."
In meeting the assertion that absolute privilege was required by
public policy, the court gives an able definition of the latter concept:
"In substance, it may be generally said to be the community common
sense and common conscience extended and applied throughout the state
to matters of public morals, public health, public safety, public welfare,
and the like. It is that general and well-settled public opinion relating
to man's plain, palpable duty to his fellow man, that has due regard
to all circumstances of each particular situation.
"Our written public policies are put into our Constitutions, our
statutes, and ordinances, but our unwritten public policies rest largely
in judicial judgment and public opinion."
When, then, a great interest grows vital in the minds of all men
and above all when it becomes articulate, it should be found working
itself into the law. If the interest is common to all men, and hot
enough in all men's minds, the law should quickly mirror it. Winning
the war was a vital interest; rigid internal unity was one great means
which age-old wisdom proved was useful to that end. Hence, legis-
lation: the Sedition and the Espionage Acts; and the state of public
feeling showed not alone in the enactment but in the interpretation of
the Acts, and in their enforcement. The Supreme Court found no
difficulty in reconciling them with the First amendmentY Prosecutors
found little trouble in securing convictions under them. The legis-
lation itself bit somewhat harder than the milk-fed laws of peace;
the means used for its enforcement corresponded. Attorneys for the
government have in such trials inflamed the passions and blind preju-
dices of the jury by vivid treatment of war horrors wholly unrelated
to the accused;6 it has been made the theme of felling argument
'Cf. Teller, J.: "In this country the sovereign people claim no attributes of
divinity, and are under no illusion as to the fallibility of those who administer
the law." In re Cottingha' (I919, Colo.) 182 Pac. 2. The case is instructive as
showing how far one may go without contempt in a petition for change of judge
on the ground of bias.
See (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 697.
'August v. United States (Ig, C. C. A. 8th) 257 Fed. 388.
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against an accused that he had failed to offer in testimony patriotic
utterances which could only have been excluded had he offered them ;7
convictions have been had for words picked out of context, in spite of
accompanying circumstances which indicated anything but a state of
mind inimical to the country.8
If interests work themselves into the law, this was to be expected;
it was well nigh inevitable. The dominant interest was to win the
war. So, also, now that the war is won, was it to be expected that
higher courts, reverting to the less drastic standards of peace-times,
would dig out of records on appeal some evidences of just such
irregularities as have been indicated, and would set about reversing
many a conviction.9
But surely there is comfort in the fact that now at last the home
of Yale University may be considered safe. Some protections against
bolshevistic taint we have had, offered by the war measures of the
federal government. To some these have seemed ample; to some,
indeed, they have seemed more than ample. Not so to the Connecticut
Legislature of 1919. In addition to an entirely proper, though volumi-
nous, statute prohibiting misuse of the flag of the United States or of
the state,10 that body has made a criminal offense of the display of a red
flag or any other symbol which might incite to disorder," or of advo-
cating in public in any language any doctrine intended injuriously
to affect the government, state or federal'--(and government is a
broad term)-or speaking or writing or distributing abusive matter
concerning the national form of government, military forces or flag.' 3
These statutes being duly passed, the responsibilities of the situation
began to weigh upon the city fathers of New Haven, and an ordinance
came into being; and among its prohibitiong, too, the red flag found a
place.' 4
It has been sometimes thought that the care of criminals was a
burden on the tax-payer. But now at length, while the wrong-doer
'Hall v. United States (1919, C. C. A. 4th) 256 Fed. 748.
'State v. Deike (igig, Minn.) 172 N. W. 777.
See cases cited in notes 6-8, supra.
10 Conn. Public Acts, I919, ch. 175.
'Ibid., ch. 35.
'Ibid., ch. 19I. In the debate on the bill it was stated that the question as
to what constituted a violation of this statute might safely be left to the
jury's determination. It is worth note that there has been much agitation
in Connecticut in favor of prohibiting the prosecuting official from practicing
in civil causes, it being urged that his relations with jurors through the criminal
cases is such as to influence them unduly and unfairly in his favor.
'Ibid., ch. 312.
"
4 New Haven ordinance, approved May 29, 1919.
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blanches, the tax-payer may leap with joy. "Carry a red flag," says
the statute, "or any other emblem . . . which may incite people
to disorder"; "display a red flag," says the ordinance-punishable by
fine. And Harvard Game approaches in New Haven-if not this year,
then next.15
The yells of football rooters and the uproarious snake-dance seem,
however, to be far from the sole disturbers of the peace. The city of
Sierra Madre has found it necessary to pass an ordinance forbidding
the maintenance in a defined residence district, of any livery stable
or corral for keeping horses, mules, or burros for hire. In Boyd v.
Sierra Madre (1919, Calif. App.) 183 Pac. 23o, an injunction was
sought against the enforcement of the ordinance, as unreasonably dis-
criminatory. The injunction was denied. The court held that exercise
of the police power was not limited to the regulation of such things
as already have become nuisances or have been declared such by a
court. The decision is eminently sane.
"Such corrals . . . are not only rife with offensive, foul-smelling
odors, but are breeding places for germ-laden, disease-bearing flies and
pestilential vermin. Not only this, but we know of no heaven-sent
maxim to invent a silencer for this brute, that one beholding him, neck
outstretched and jaws distended wide, could persuade himself that he
but heard from the depths of the beast's crimson-coated cavern
'a sound so fine there's nothing lives
'Twixt it and silence.'
"We fear that, until nature evolves the whispering burro or man
invents some harmless but effective mule-muffler, we shall oft 'in the
dead and vast middle of the night,' even in such corrals as appellant's,
kept 'in a cleanly,, wholesome, and sanitary manner,' hear the loud, dis-
cordant bray of this sociable but shrill-toned friend of man . . .
"It should not be a matter of surprise, therefore, that the noisome
smell from these animals and their loud, strident cacophonies bring the
keeping of them in a populous city or town 'within the legal notion of
a nuisance.'
Thus does the burro share the fate of the vagrant, neighbor-
plaguing chickens and the jackass within the hearing of the populace
of Arkansas, whose fate as nuisances has long been here recorded.
1 6
Meanwhile, that other friend of man, the dog, has been establishing
himself in the law not as a nuisance but as a subject of property on
'And it will be recalled that it was pressure from Harvard University
which caused the repeal of the Massachusetts statute.
10 (1917) 26 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 250.
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the one hand,17 and on the other, as, in conjunction with scienter, a
source of duty to pay damages. Both of these aspects of dogdom
were involved in Roos v. Loeser (1919, Calif. App.) 183 Pac. 2o4.
"It appears that on said day the Pomeranian, attended by two maids,
was pursuing the even tenor of its way upon the street, 'tarrying'
now and then and occupied with matters entirely his own, when the
Airedale, an arrogant bully, domineering and dogmatic, being beyond
the reach of the sound of his master's voice and having evaded the
vigilance of his keeper (for the maids and the man were vigilant),
dashed upon the scene, and with destruction in his heart and mayhem
in his teeth pounced upon the Pomeranian with the result already
regretfully recorded; the plaintiff's dog had had its day. It crossed
to that shore from which none, not even a good dog, ever returns."
We need only remark that the court recognizes the scienter require-
ment; that it very properly refused to allow the plaintiff's failure to
provide his Pomeranian with a license to operate without more as
"contributory negligence" to bar recovery; and, finally, that if one
apply to this decision the doctrine advanced in the earlier portions of
this comment, it will appear that the lap-dog habit has made its way
into the mores of our country.
"' With this development from a thing not the subject of larceny, regarded
as kept only through caprice, into the well established status of the dog in law
to-day, compare Willes, C. J., in Davies v. Powell, supra, regarding the very
similar development in the law relating to deer.
